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Statement of Issues on Appeal 
I. Did the trial court err in granting summary 
judgment, when the parties dispute (1) whether timely, proper 
approval from Mr. Holt was necessary and was received, and (2) 
whether the earnest money check was dishonored? 
II. Was it proper to base summary judgment on Holt's 
hearsay statement that bank employees told her by telephone that 
the check would not be good if deposited? 
III. Did the court err in finding a "failure of 
consideration" based upon the alleged inability to cash the 
earnest money check? 
IV. Was it error to base summary judgment on an 
alleged "violation of the Statute of Frauds", and was there such 
a "violation"? 
V. Is Holt bound by her oral agreement to close the 
purchase a day later than the one provided in the earnest money 
agreement? 
Determinative Authorities 
Appendix A hereto are copies of the following: 
Utah Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-1, Utah Code (1974); § 
25-5-8, Utah Code (1943). 
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Uniform Commercial Code, § 70A-3-504, Utah Code (1965); § 
70A-3-507, Utah Code (1965). 
Also annexed hereto are the following additional 
Appendices: 
Appendix B: Order Denying Plaintiff's Objection to Order 
Granting Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for New 
Trial or to Correct Order, and Directing Defendant to Redraft 
Original Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant. 
Appendix C: Order Granting Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Appendix D: Holt Deposition, page 22. 
Appendix E: Earnest money agreement. 
Appendix F. Holt Deposition, pages 10-11. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Objection to Order Granting Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or to Correct Order, and 
Directing Defendant to Redraft Original Order Granting Summary 
Judgment to Defendant, entered March 16, 1990, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Appendix B, and also from the Order 
Granting Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment, entered the same date and attached as Appendix 
C. 
The complaint sought specific performance and damages 
under an Earnest Money Agreement. The counterclaim sought 
rescission and damages for fraud and breach of the same 
agreement. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
i. Initial proceedings. In September, 1986 appellant 
("Krantz") sued appellee ("Holt") to enforce the parties1 
"Earnest Money Sales Agreement". R. 1-8. Holt moved to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, based on the alleged failure of 
her ex husband (since remarried to her) to sign the Earnest 
Money Receipt. R. 12-15; agreement attached as Appendix E. 
That motion was stricken at Holt's own request. R. 21. 
Holt answered, denying nearly every allegation of the 
complaint. R. 22-27. She also counterclaimed, alleging various 
misrepresentations and breach of contract by Krantz. R. 26-29. 
Holt moved to compel discovery in November, 1987, but this 
motion was also later stricken at her own request. R. 37, 62. 
Further discovery was conducted. 
On October 2, 1990 trial was scheduled to commence on 
January 31, 1990. R. 111. But Holt moved for summary judgment 
the same day. R. 82-110. The motion suggested that the 
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complaint should be dismissed because Holt's husband did not 
sign the agreement/ Krantz's check was allegedly bad, and 
closing did not occur by the date mentioned in the agreement. 
Krantz also moved for summary judgment as to both his own 
complaint and Holt's counterclaim. R. 114-116. The cross 
motions were briefed, and were argued to the court December 19, 
1989. R. 145. The depositions of the parties as well as 
Herbert Holzier (a witness) were published. 
ii. Disposition at trial (summary judgment). No trial 
was held. Improperly resolving a factual dispute, the trial 
court found on summary judgment that the S500 earnest money 
check was dishonored. This, said the court, constituted 
failure of consideration. 
The court also found that Holt's ex-husband failed to 
approve the sale in writing, although the necessity of a writing 
was disputed. This alleged failure, and the "bad" check were 
held to be substantial violations of the agreement and valid 
excuses not to convey the property. 
The court further found that scheduling the closing for a 
day later than that contemplated by the agreement was not 
sufficient alone to excuse Holt from the sale. R. 145 (minute 
entry dated December 26, 1989). 
Holt's counsel drafted and submitted to the court a 
proposed "Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment." R. 
187-191* The purported summary judgment contained "Findings of 
Fact" and "Conclusions of Law." Id. Krantz objected to the 
proposed order, and simultaneously moved for a new trial or to 
correct the order on January 11, 1990. R. 154-178. 
iii. New orders and judgment. By minute entry January 
31, 1990 the court denied the motion for a new trial or to 
correct the judgment. R. 192. Holt's counsel was ordered to 
redraft the order, however, to omit the Findings of Fact. Two 
new orders were drafted, and were signed by the court March 16, 
1990. Appendices B and C hereto. They are: 
a. "Order Denying Plaintiff's Objection to Order 
Granting Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a 
New Trial or to Correct Order, and Directing Defendant to 
Redraft Original Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant." 
This document "denied" Krantz's objections to the original order 
and his motion for a new trial or to correct the order, but 
requires Holt to submit a new order, omitting the Findings of 
Fact. The last paragraph of the order is difficult to 
comprehend. Appendix B, R. 194-195. 
b. "Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment." 
This document summarily dismisses the complaint and grants to 
Holt 
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the relief sought in her counterclaim for recision 
[sic] of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement based 
upon the failure of consideration tendered by the 
Plaintiff in the form of a personal check, which 
was dishonored; violation of the Statute of Frauds; 
and, when coupled with the failure of consideration 
and violation of the Statute of Frauds, on the 
further ground that the closing was not timely. 
Appendix B, R. 196-197. Holt was granted her costs. Krantz 
suggests that necessary to this order were factual findings by 
the court, including that the check was dishonored. 
Krantz filed his Notice of Appeal April 16, 1990, and it 
was received by this Court on April 25th. On June 11, 1990 
Krantz filed with the Court a stipulation of the parties 
enlarging the time within which to file this brief to and 
including June 21, 1990. 
C. Relevant Pacts 
i. Earnest money payment. The parties entered into an 
earnest money agreement, pursuant to which Krantz was to 
purchase from Holt a residence in Bountiful. R. 85; 118. As 
earnest money, Krantz present to Holt a $500 check. Id. The 
check was never formally presented to the bank, however Holt 
alleges (and Krantz disputes) that she contacted the bank more 
than once and was told it would not clear. The parties dispute 
whether it would have been honored by the bank if properly 
presented. R. 85-86; 118-119. Nevertheless, the trial judge 
ruled that it was "dishonored." Appendix C, R. 196-197. 
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Because Holt claimed the check would not clear if she 
were to deposit it, the parties agreed that the $500 could be 
included in the purchase price paid at closing. Holt Depo. p. 
22, Appendix D. 
The purchase price of the home was set at $27,000. The 
low price was because it was constructed on unstable ground and 
had been condemned by the City of Bountiful. Krantz Depo. 25, 
26, 32, 33. 
ii. Ex-husband's approval. The name of Holt's former 
husband Stephen appeared on the public records as a joint tenant 
owner of the residence, however his interest had previously been 
terminated by a Decree of Divorce. R. 86; 120. The decree 
awarding the property to Holt had not been recorded, nor had 
Stephen formally deeded the property to Holt. The agreement 
stated that the offer would be "subject to approval of Stephen 
Holt by 8-4-86". Stephen gave his approval orally, but the 
parties dispute whether the approval was timely under the 
agreement. R. 86-87; 120-121. 
iii. Closing date. The written agreement calls for a 
closing date of August 20, 1986. It also provides that in the 
event of unavoidable delay, closing would be automatically 
extended seven days, but not longer than 30 days, and that 
"thereafter time is of the essence." R. 94-97. 
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The parties agreed orally to close on August 21, a day 
later than the one mentioned in the agreement. Holt selected 
August 21st to meet her needs. R. 119; Krantz Depo. p. 77. The 
closing date and time were reconfirmed by telephone two and a 
half hours before the scheduled closing, and Krantz deposited 
with the title company the full purchase price. Id. at 49, 1. 
18-24. He appeared at the closing, but Holt changed her mind 
and failed to appear. Id. at 77. She now seeks to avoid any 
obligation to convey the property to Krantz. 
On the date scheduled for closing, Krantz deposited a 
cashier's check for the full amount necessary to purchase the 
property. Krantz Depo. p. 53-55. The money was left on deposit 
with the title company for several days after the failed 
closing. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court ignored several genuine factual disputes 
and inappropriately weighed the evidence in granting summary 
judgment. Holt's effort to have the judge make "Findings of 
Fact" illustrates this abuse of summary judgment proceedings. 
Holt's former husband had no interest in the property, and 
neither the contract nor any law required that his approval be 
in writing. 
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The variations from the earnest money agreement were not 
substantial, and were all waived by Holt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. All facts are construed in Krantz's favor. No 
evidence was taken, and the complaint was dismissed on summary 
judgment as a matter of law. As a challenge to summary judgment 
presents for review conclusions of law only, the standard is to 
review the conclusions for correctness without any deference to 
the trial court. City Consumer Services v. Peters, 133 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12, 13 (May 3, 1990). All factual questions should be 
resolved for present purposes in favor of Krantz. Rule 56, 
URCP; Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 681 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1984). If there are outstanding, genuine issues of fact, 
summary judgment cannot be awarded. Id. 
II. EARNEST MONEY CHECK 
2. Whether the check was dishonored is a factual 
dispute. Yet summary dismissal of the complaint and granting of 
relief on the counterclaim were "based upon the failure of 
consideration tendered by the Plaintiff in the form of a 
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personal check, which was dishonored. . . . " Appendix C, R. 
196-197. 
Holt alleges that she "presented" the check at a bank on 
August 5 and again on August 21, 1986 (the day of the scheduled 
closing). Ans. to Interr. # 2, R. 99. She alleges it was 
"dishonored by the bank on both occasions/ and they refused to 
cash the check." Id. She also claims that on two occasions 
between August 5 and August 21 she called the bank and was told 
there were insufficient funds to cover it. Id. 
However, Krantz had a credit arrangement with the bank 
for payment of the check had it been deposited at any branch or 
presented for payment in cash at the branch where his account 
was. Krantz Aff., R. 116, 118-119. And his account balance was 
sufficient to cover the check even without using his credit on 
various dates, including August 14 through 21. Id. at R. 3. 
His deposition testimony includes the following: 
Q On August 1, 1986, at the time you wrote that 
checks, were there sufficient funds in the account 
on which the check was drawn to clear? 
A I believe so. 
Q Do you know? 
A Had the check ever been deposited, it would have 
cleared. I had an arrangement with the manager of 
the bank, a long term relationship. My checks were 
always paid even if it overdrew my account. 
Krantz Depo. pp 36, 1. 19 to 37, 1. 2. 
So whether the check was good is hotly disputed. To 
reach the conclusion that it did, the trial court must have 
determined that the check was "dishonored". Such a factual 
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resolution cannot be had on summary judgment. See, Mountain 
States Telephonef 681 P.2d at 1261. 
3. The judge relied on inadmissible hearsay in finding 
the check was dishonored. The only evidence of dishonor was 
Holt's testimony that some unidentified bank employee(s) told 
her the check would not clear. Ans. to Interr. # 2, R. 99. She 
did not run it through any bank to find out. 
The claim that the check was dishonored, then, is 
supported only by Holt's bald hearsay statement. "'Hearsay' 
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted." Utah Rules of Evidence 
801((c). Holt testifies that a bank employee told her the funds 
were insufficient, and uses that second hand statement alone to 
try to prove the check was dishonored. 
The supposed oral statement by the bank's agent does not 
qualify as a "business record", nor does it fall within any 
other exception to the hearsay rule. Krantz opposed the check 
story as inadmissible hearsay. R. 119. 
If hearsay were properly admitted on this point, Krantz1 
hearsay statement of follows would also be admissible, further 
creating a factual issue: 
Q Have you ever asked your bank to verify whether 
that check would have been honored had it been 
presented on the dates that Mrs. Holt indicated in 
the Answers to Interrogatories she had presented it 
for payment? 
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A On one of the dates that she had presented it 
for payment, they did say they would have cleared 
it. 
Q Who told you that? 
A That was looking at my bank statement and also 
talking with someone at Commercial Security or Key 
Bank. I'm not sure who I talked to. 
. . . . 
Q What did they tell you your balance was as of 
the 21st day of August 1986? 
A Approximately $2,000. 
Q Is it not true that as of the 5th day of August 
that check would not have cleared? 
A No, that's not true. If the check were 
presented to my branch or deposited, it would have 
cleared. 
Q Did that person that you talked to tell you 
that? 
A Did that person? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Who told you that? Your friend? 
A The branch manager at the time. 
Krantz Depo. p. 42, 1. 18 to 43 1. 4; p. 44, 1. 16 to 45 1. 5. 
4. Bolt agreed to have Krantz include the earnest money 
in the amount to be paid at closing. Krantz Aff., R. 116, 119. 
Thus the contract was either modified, or she waived her right 
to insist on strict performance of the contract. The trial 
court ignored this in granting summary judgment. Yet it is an 
undisputed fact in Krantz1s favor. 
Q What was discussed about the earnest money 
check? 
A She (Holt) had told me that she had taken my 
check to the bank and that it would not clear. 
Q What was your response to that? 
A I told her that if she deposited it, it would 
clear or if she wanted me to get her a different 
check I would do that. She told me to just bring 
it at the time of closing, which I did. The 
cashier's check that I deposited at the closing 
included the $500 earnest money. 
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Krantz Depo. p. 46, 1. 2 to 12. 
Q But notwithstanding the fact you hadn't been 
able to cash the $500 check, you were still willing 
to close as of the morning of the closing? 
A I told him that morning that the check had not 
been cleared or not been cashed. 
Q What did he say about that? 
A He would include it in the final. 
Q Did you make any objection to that? 
A No. 
Q That was agreeable to you, was it not? 
A That's fine. 
Holt Depo. p. 22, 1. 2 to 12, Appendix D. It is difficult to 
imagine how, in light of the parties' agreement, the $500 check 
could possibly be found to excuse Holt from her contract. 
5. Even dishonor of the check would not be a "failure of 
consideration," contrary to the court's ruling. R. 197, 
Appendix B. After improperly finding that the earnest money 
check was dishonored, the trial judge then made a leap of logic 
to conclude that Holt's performance was excused because 
consideration had failed. 
The term "failure of consideration" has fallen into 
disuse and leads to confusion. Calamari & Perillo, Contracts, 
2d Ed. § 11-25; Restatement, Contracts (2d) § 262, Comment a. 
This makes it more difficult to review the judge's holding. 
However, the term seems to refer to a major failure to perform 
by one side, which may sometimes excuse performance on the part 
of the other. But, 
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It is not every minor failure, which could 
otherwise be remedied, which will justify 
nonperformance. It must be something so 
substantial that it could be reasonably deemed to 
vindicate the other's refusal to perform; and this 
is a matter of affirmative excuse or justification, 
which the party so 
claiming has the burden of demonstrating. 
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (1975). 
By offering hearsay evidence that she was told that the 
check would not be honored if she had tried to deposit it, 
while admitting that she agreed the $500 could be paid at 
closing, Holt has fallen far short of her burden of showing a 
substantial failure of performance. 
6. Since the check was never properly presented, it 
cannot have been dishonored. Yet the court held that it was, 
ignoring the definitions set forth in the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
(1) An instrument is dishonored when 
(a) a necessary or optional presentment is duly 
made and due acceptance or payment is refused or 
cannot be obtained within the prescribed time or in 
case of bank collections the instrument is 
reasonably returned by the midnight deadline; or 
(b) presentment is excused and the instrument 
is not duly accepted or paid. 
§ 70A-3-507(l), Utah Code (1965) (emphasis added). Yet Holt did 
not even deposit the check, but merely made inquiry as to its 
acceptability. "Presentment is a demand for acceptance or 
payment made upon the maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by 
or on behalf of the holder." § 70A-3-504 (1) , Utah Code (1965) 
(emphasis added). 
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7. The earnest money was not the primary consideration 
for the contract. Appendix E. The $500 is "given to secure and 
apply on the purchase of the property . . . ." 1 1 . Paragraph 
two provides that the purchase price is $27,000, including the 
$500 and $26,500 to be paid at closing. Id. Consideration for 
the contract is the agreement to purchase and sale the property 
for $27,000. Mutual promises constitute consideration. 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 
706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985). 
At best, Holt's claim is that the alleged late payment of 
the $500 (less than two percent of the price) defeats the 
purpose of the whole contract. Rescission is available only 
when one party has committed a material breach which destroys 
the entire purpose for entering into the contract. Crowley v. 
Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 854, 106 Idaho 818 (1984). 
The court's award of restitution and rescission would be 
proper only if there had been a "material" breach. Polyglycoat 
Corporation v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (1979). It must be of 
such prime importance that the contract would not have been made 
if the default had been contemplated, or must defeat the very 
object of the contract. Id. 
Had Holt simply appeared at closing as she had agreed 
(and reconfirmed that very morning, Krantz Depo. p. 49, 1. 
18-24), she would have been paid the full purchase price. The 
money had been delivered to the title company. Id. at p. 53-55. 
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Failure of consideration occurs when a party, without his fault, 
fails to receive the agreed exchange. Bentley v. Potter, 694 
P.2d 617 (Utah 1984). But it was entirely Holt's fault that she 
was not at closing to receive the purchase price. See, Holt 
Depo. p. 15, 1. 14 et seq. 
III. APPROVAL OF EX-HUSBAND 
8. Lack of Holt's former husband's approval was not a 
•violation of the statute of frauds," as the court erroneously 
held. Order, Appendix C, R. 197. In addition to "failure of 
consideration", this "violation" was the court's other reason 
for excusing Holt's performance. Nothing in the agreement 
required that his approval be written. Appendix E, p. 3, K 7 
("Offer subject to approval of Stephen Holt by 8-4-86"). 
Neither the court nor Holt's memoranda adequately 
explains what section of the statute of frauds applies to the 
above clause, requiring the approval to be written. And Holt 
cannot transform to her own benefit her tardiness in recording 
her sole ownership to get the residence in her name alone, since 
this failure does not bring the approval clause within the 
statute of frauds. 
The statute of frauds applies only to owners of an 
interest in the property, and to a person who is "creating, 
granting, surrendering or declaring . . . an estate or interest 
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in real property." § 25-5-1, Utah Code. Stephen Holt was doing 
none of these things by approving his ex-wife's decision to sell 
her separately owned home. So the statute of frauds is 
irrelevant, and the court erred. 
9. The earnest money agreement simply allowed Bolt to 
consult her ex-husband. She had the option to terminate the 
contract if by August 4, 1986 he advised against the proposed 
sale. Appendix E, p. 3, % 7 ("Offer subject to approval of 
Stephen Holt by 8-4-86n). 
Rather than exercising her option, Holt did obtain her 
former husband's approval, and so advised Krantz. 
Q (By Mr. Barker) Prior to the time that Mr. 
Krantz appeared at the title company to close the 
transaction, did you ever discuss with your 
ex-husband, Stephen Holt, whether or not he 
approved the transaction as contemplated by 
Paragraph 7 of Appendix 2 (the earnest money 
agreement)? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q When did that conversation take place? 
A Approximately one week after the earnest money 
offer. 
. . . . 
Q What did you say to him and he to you with 
respect to the matter? 
A I said, nI have an offer on the house. What do 
you think of that?" He said, "It's up to you." 
Q Is that the full content of the conversation 
with respect to his approval? 
A In a nutshell. 
Appendix F, Holt Depo. p. 10, 1. 13 to 11, 1. 10. About August 
10 (eleven days before closing) Holt informed Krantz she had 
secured her ex-husband's approval. Krantz Depo. p. 47, 1. 15 to 
48, 1. 5. 
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Q You were aware that the title report that you 
had obtained did show Mr* Holt as a joint tenant on 
the property, were you not? 
A Yes, I was. But I was also aware that it was 
still not necessary to have Stephen Holt sign 
anything. 
Q This is based on this knowledge that you 
testified on redirect and also back into direct 
testimony? 
A Yes. 
Q This fellow at Guardian Title - -
A That, and also the fact that I was told by Miss 
Holt that that was taken care of, and as of even 
three hours prior to closing on the morning of 
the closing I was told everything was fine, and 
based on the fact that that was not one of the 
reasons she gave me for not closing. 
Q What reasons did she give you for not closing? 
A The only reason she gave me was Mr. Holzer's 
involvement in the transaction or his alleged 
involvement, which she believed it to be. 
Krantz Depo. p. 78, 1. 25 to 79, 1. 21. 
10. Holt's ex-husband held no interest in the home. So 
his written approval is not required under the statute of 
frauds. § 25-5-1 Utah Code, et seq. And the fact that Holts 
remarried three years after the sale (Holt Depo. p. 3, 1. 23-24) 
does not change this result. A lis pendens was filed in this 
case before the remarriage. R. 116, 120. 
Holts were owners of record in joint tenancy during their 
initial marriage. Both names still appeared on the public 
record, which was the only reason his approval was called for by 
the earnest money agreement. Holt Depo. p. 9, 1. 24 to 10, 1. 
4. When they divorced in 1982 the home was awarded to Holt as 
her sole and separate property. Holt Depo. p. 4, 1. 4-6 & p. 6, 
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1. 18-21; R. 120, 132-133. All that remained to be done was to 
remove his name of record by recording the divorce decree or a 
deed. 
Q (By Mr. Barker) Was there anything remaining to 
be done other than your ex-husband conveying legal 
title to you? That is, was there anything you had 
to do before he was to do that? 
A No. 
Q What was the reason that he had not given you a 
deed to the house at the time that you borrowed the 
money? 
A I can't recall a reason. 
Holt Depo. p. 8, 1. 20 to 8, 1. 3. 
A large insurance claim was made for damage to the home 
due to instable soil. Since Holt was the sole owner, the entire 
amount was paid to her. Holt Depo. p. 5, 1. 1-7. Indeed, the 
earnest money agreement itself referred only to Holt herself as 
"Seller.n Appendix E, R. 94-97. Neither the agreement nor Utah 
law requires that a person's advice from her ex-spouse must be 
given in writing. 
11. Williams case does not apply. Holt (and apparently 
the trial court) relied heavily on one case for the assertion 
that the contract is unenforceable for failure of her ex-husband 
to approve of the sale in writing. Williams v. Singleton, 723 
P.2d 432 (Utah 1986). To the contrary, the reasoning of that 
case supports Krantz's position that the contract is enforceable 
without his written consent. 
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Williams is distinguishable from this case in various 
ways, including the following: 
i. Holt is a sole owner. In Williams the sellers were 
married and each actually owned an undivided one-half interest 
in the property. Of course the court held that the signature of 
both was required. 
Here Holt, as a sole owner, had the freedom to sell the 
property without the consent of her former husband. The wording 
she had inserted concerning obtaining her husband's approval did 
not limit her unconditional right to sell the property without 
his consent, but simply gave her the option to back out of the 
transaction if he advised against the sale. She did not try to 
exercise that option, but rather obtained his approval. 
ii. Oral agency is not involved. Williams held that an 
oral power of attorney from one spouse authorizing the other to 
accept the offer to sell joint property was expressly barred by 
§ 25-5-1, Utah Code. This was because the transfer (unlike the 
approval here) would create an "estate or interest in real 
property", so it must be 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
723 P.2d at 423, quoting § 25-5-1, Utah Code (emphasis added). 
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Holt's ex-husband, on the other hand, was not creating or 
transfering an interest in real property when he approved of the 
sale. And there was no agency required, written or otherwise. 
iii. Mutuality of agreement. This was an important 
factor discussed in Williams. 723 P.d at 424-425. Here, since 
Holt is the sole owner of the property, she could have prevailed 
in enforcing the sale contract against Krantz without the 
written consent of her husband. The contract is likewise 
enforceable by Krantz against her. Her ex-husband, on the other 
hand, had no right at all that he could enforce against either 
party. Why would his written consent be required? 
iv. Part performance. This was not involved in 
Williams, but is here, as discussed below. 
12. The statute of frauds is inapplicable to this 
specific performance action. It provides: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be 
construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel 
the specific performance of agreements in case of 
part performance thereof. 
§ 25-5-8, Utah Code (1907). So even if the ex-husband 
consultation clause were somehow construed to create or transfer 
an interest in realty, it need not have been written. 
- 26 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
An oral contract for the sale of land may be specifically 
enforceable so long as it is definite, certain and fair, and 
part performance has occurred. In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 
40, 269 P.2d 278 (1954). Here the contract is specific and 
written. The approval of the ex-husband, which is not even a 
contract clause, is the only aspect which was oral ("It's up to 
you"). Appendix F, Holt Depo. p. 11, 1. 6-7. The part 
performance must be clearly referable to the contract. Id. at 
281. But where, as here, the contract (including Holt's 
ex-husband's approval) are admitted, the elements of part 
performance are easily satisfied. See, Woolsey v. Brown, 539 
P.2d 1035 (1975). 
Krantz's performance under the contract included the 
following: 
i. He acquired the nearly $27,000 to close, and had it 
ready for delivery early the morning of the scheduled closing. 
Krantz Depo. p. 50, 1. 3-11, p. 54, 20 to 55 1. 16. 
ii. He signed a note obligating to him repay the money 
to his lender. Krantz Depo. p. 52, 1. 11-18. 
iii. The funds were left deposited at the title company 
for two to three weeks. Krantz Depo. p. 53, 1. 14-24. 
iv. He lost interest of na couple of hundred dollars" 
for the two to three weeks the money was on deposit at the title 
company. Krantz Depo. p. 56, 1. 14-24. 
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v* He lost a cancellation fee of about $75 on the title 
report and of about $180 for appraisal costs. 
vi. He appeared at the closing, only to have Holt back 
out, essentially at the last minute. Krantz Depo. p. 77, 1. 18 
to 78, 1. 1. 
With such part performance, Holt may not excuse herself 
by her own failure. If a written approval was required, it 
would surely be her duty to secure it. 
IV. CLOSING DATE 
mmmoBamasnamsaBxsxsKaEBsac: 
13. The parties agreed to close a day later than was 
specified in the contract. R. 116, 126. The third reason Holt 
used for not conveying the property was that the closing 
occurred on August 21 rather than August 20. The trial court 
correctly held that this was "just an excuse not to close", but 
indicated it had some merit when combined with the other 
excuses. R. 145. 
The new closing date was by agreement of the parties, and 
in fact Holt selected the date. R. 119; Krantz Depo. p. 77. 
The closing date and time were reconfirmed by telephone two and 
a half hours before the scheduled closing. Id. at 49, 1. 
18-24. Parties to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any 
or all of the contract, even if the contract itself says they 
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cannot. See, Ted R. Brown & Assoc, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 
P.2d 964 (Utah 1988). 
The written agreement calls for closing by August 20, 
1986. It also provides that in the event of unavoidable delay, 
closing would be automatically extended seven days, but not 
longer than 30 days, and that "thereafter time is of the 
essence." R. 94-97, Appendix E (emphasis added). Like the 
allegedly dishonored check, the closing date variance was not a 
"material" breach, either alone or in conjunction with other 
alleged defects. Polyglycoat Corporation v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 
449, 451 (1979). 
V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTERCLAIM 
14. The counterclaim should be dismissed. Krantz moved 
for summary judgment of specific performance and damages, and 
for dismissal of Holt's counterclaim. R. 114-116. The trial 
court should have granted the motion, since the parties had a 
valid, enforceable earnest money agreement bearing Holt's 
signature, and Krantz appeared at closing on the appointed date 
with full payment in hand. 
In support of his motion to summarily dismiss the 
counterclaim, Krantz filed a memorandum including a Statement of 
Undisputed Facts. R. 112-113. Holt failed to dispute the facts 
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as required by Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Admin. R. 138. 
Accordingly, they are admitted for purposes of summary judgment 
and the counterclaim should have been dismissed. 
CONCLDSION 
Holt failed to present the earnest money check, agreed to 
waive any claimed dishonor and yet refused to close. The court 
excused that refusal, mistakenly finding the check was 
dishonored. This factual determination was summarily made, 
despite Krantz's substantial evidence to the contrary. 
The agreement allowed Holt an out if her ex-husband would 
not approve the sale. He did approve, however. Holt failed to 
get the approval in writing, and used this, too, as an excuse 
not to convey the property. The statute of frauds is not 
involved since the ex-husband neither owned nor conveyed any 
interest in realty, and since Krantz fully performed his part of 
the contract. 
Krantz requests that the Court reverse the summary 
judgment dismissing Krantz's complaint, and remand with 
instructions to grant summary judgment to Krantz specifically 
enforcing the contract, and dismissing the counterclaim. 
Respectfully submitted this fifteenth day of June, 1990. 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Counsel for Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
Determinative 
Utah Statute of Frauds, § 
25-5-8, Utah Code (1943). 
Uniform Commercial Code, 
70A-3-507, Utah Code (1965). 
"A" 
Authorities 
25-5-1, Utah Code (1974); § 
70A-3-504, Utah Code (1965); § 
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25-4-1 FRAUD 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL 
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, £ 10-102.) 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L. 
1931, ch. 54, §§ 1 to 4; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
33-4-1 to 33-4-3), relating to the marketing of 
wool, were repealed bv Laws 1965, ch. 
§ 10-102 
154, 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 
25-5-1. 
25-5-2. 
25-5-3. 
25-5-4. 
25-5-5. 
Estate or interest in real property. 
Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
Leases and contracts for interest in 
lands. 
Certain agreements void unless 
written and subscribed. 
Representation as to credit of third 
person. 
Section 
25-5-6. 
25-5-7. 
25-5-8. 
25-5-9. 
Promise to answer for obligation of 
another — When not required to 
be in writing. 
Contracts by telegraph deemed writ-
ten. 
Right to specific performance not af-
fected. 
Agent may sign for principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or 
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surren-
dered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto autho-
rized by writing. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974, 
2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874,5811; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 33-5-1. 
Cross-References. — Contract for sale of 
goods for $500 or more unenforceable in ab-
sence of some writing, § 70A-2-201. 
Enforceability of security interests, 
§ 70A-9-203. 
Securities sales, statute of frauds for con-
tracts, § 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal prop-
erty not otherwise covered, § 70A-1-206. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application. 
Adjoining landowners. 
Agent's authority. 
Blank deeds or papers. 
Contents of deed. 
Corporate officers. 
Custom and usage. 
Dedication of land. 
Defenses to action on contract. 
Easements. 
Gifts. 
"Interest in real property." 
Leases. 
Modifications of contract. 
Mortgages, and estates or interests of parties 
thereto. 
Nature of required writing. 
Option to purchase. 
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS 25-5-1 
.gntracts to buy or sell land, 
executed agreement, 
partition. 
v ^rformance of oral contract generally, 
.uvements and other expenditures. 
,r> of money paid under parol contract. 
. >v discharge and surrender. 
vuve covenants. 
. performance. 
^ x x . iption. 
. tenants. 
^ ..**;* construed together. 
. .auction and application. 
^ meaning of the word "interest" in this 
, ^ depends on statutory construction gov-
. ;>v legislative intent. In re Reynolds' Es-
*' Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270 (1936). 
v>«a»ing landowners. 
^_. agreement between adjoining land-
v > as to location of a boundary line is not 
. ^  statute of frauds, provided, among other 
\
 N-^  the location of the true boundary line 
>. to be thus established is or has been 
sxV^un or in dispute. But mere fact that the 
^.. claiming title by parol agreement owns 
j , vv#acent to the land thus sought to be con-
,s cannot and does not change statute of 
.* requiring conveyance of real estate to be 
,
 Aung, without regard to any uncertainty 
w^LUvm of true boundary line. Tripp v. 
,, -0 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 
1
 , Jvining landowners acquiesce in a divi-
de other than the true line, with knowl-
,» the location of the true line and with a 
x and purpose of thereby transferring a 
;•,' land from one to the other, such acqui-
x „v alone will not operate as a conveyance. 
\ ,. cannot be conveyed from one person to 
v^^ >. by merely changing possession, even 
j ,
 u>h such change in possession continues for 
i v>\> V*Ti°d of time. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 
I' • V'O P- 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 (1928). 
A|»vwt'* authority. 
\\ M v ' at the time an agreement for the pur-
llf|M%. sd land was entered into, there was no 
'
 j(,mn requiring an agent's authority to con-
•
 ttt, \\w the purchase of real estate to be in ))\\\+ the contract would not be invalidated. 
• V M>« v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2, 
t'(l)jr- Ann. Cas. 407 (1910). j H nil action for specific performance of a con-
,, j»v the sale of real property, held in ab-
/M *>f evidence showing defendant's agent 
',
 Mutliorized in writing to sell real property 
, ,jui( it>s taking the case out of the statute of 
,Mj„, the trial court properly granted a mo-
tion for dismiBBa^  of the action. ILee v. 
Polyhrones, 57 Utah 401, 195 P. 201 (1921). 
A corporation cannot be held to be the agent 
of or a trustee for a stockholder unless this sec-
tion is complied with. Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah 
26£, 9 P.2d 396 (1932). 
Blank deeds or papers. 
Blank deeds which were executed before the 
description had been placed thereon were void 
and did not convey any interest or title what-
ever. Utah State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Per-
kins, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 (1919). 
Contents of deed. 
Where grantors sought to rescind a transac-
tion because the name of the grantee of the 
deed did not appear on the paper at the time 
the grantors signed it, it was held this section 
required only the signature of the grantor in 
order to bind him to the transaction. Hanson v. 
Beehive Sec. Co., 14 Utah 2d 157, 380 P.2d 66 
(1963). 
Corporate officers. 
This section is applicable to agents of corpo-
rations, but the courts have adopted an excep-
tion when the person who acts under an oral 
authorization is either a general agent or exec-
utive officer of the corporation. In the case of 
an executive officer of a corporation an excep-
tion from the requirement of written authority 
is based upon the idea that he is something 
more than an agent. He is the representative of 
the corporation itself. Mathis v. Madsen, 1 
Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952 (1953). 
Custom and usage. 
Evidence of a course of dealing or of industry 
usage and custom is not admissible to show 
that real property used to secure one obligation 
pursuant to a trust deed is also meant to secure 
another obligation. Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987). 
Dedication of land. 
Implied dedication of land for highway is not 
within statute of frauds. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 
Utah 305, 64 P. 955 (1901). 
Defenses to action on contract 
Under this section, fraud and deceit may 
constitute the gravamen of an action, notwith-
standing that the breach of a contract within 
the statute is incidentally involved, and the 
statute in such a case is not a defense. But if 
the gravamen of the action is breach of an oral 
contract for 6ale of land, it is a defense al-
though fraud and deceit are incidentally in-
volved. Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 
274 P. 856 (1929). 
Easements. 
Where contract seller acquiesced to the relo-
cation of an easement ditch, contract pur-
chaser's and defendants' oral agreement to 
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25-5-1 FRAUD 
move the ditch was valid even though contract 
purchaser did not complete the contract, and 
even though not in writing contract was 
thereby enforceable against a subsequent pur 
chaser from the landowner Lvman Grazing 
Ass'n v Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 905 
(1970) 
Right sought by defendants to maintain a 
pipeline across plaintiffs land was an ease 
ment and was required to be in wntmg in the 
absence of sufficient evidence to support a find-
ing of part performance under an oral or im 
plied agreement Wells v Marcus, 25 Utah 2d 
242, 480 P 2d 129 (1971) 
Oral agreement to execute easement if a fed-
eral lease was acquired, but which agreement 
was never put into writing or executed, could 
not later be asserted as an exception to the 
Btatute of frauds McKmnon v Corporation of 
President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 529 P 2d 434 (Utah 1974) 
Gifts. 
This section has been applied to a parol gift 
of land, where the donor exercised acts of ex-
clusive occupancy over the premises during the 
donee's occupanc>, notwithstanding that the 
latter made improvements thereon, but not of a 
substantial or permanent character Price v 
Lloyd, 43 Utah 441, 135 P 268 (1913) 
Under this section an oral gift or grant of 
land can only be established by evidence that 
is clear, convincing and unequivocal, more es-
pecially where the alleged donor and donee are 
close relations such as mother and daughter 
Nor will the mere making of improvements on 
the land by alleged donee suffice to prove a gift 
of the land Boland v Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 
293 P 7 (1930) (decided under prior law) 
"Interest in real property." 
Where grantor sought to repudiate a deed 
conveying land because of his incapacity at the 
time of execution, and grantee orally agreed 
that, in consideration that grantor would let 
deed stand, he would pay grantor for life one-
half of the crops produced on the land, it was 
held that the agreement was not one for an 
"estate or interest in real property" within this 
section Johnson v Johnson, 31 Utah 408, 88 
P 230 (1906) 
Oral agreement between a builder and a 
landowner that a building should remain per-
sonal propertj is not within statute, because 
not involving the sale of an interest in land 
Workman v Henne, 71 Utah 400, 266 P 1033, 
58 A L R 1346 (1928) 
Leases 
A stranger cannot avail himself of the re-
quirement that a lease for more than a year 
must be in wntmg, when the stranger is sued 
by lessee for trespass Livingston v Thornley, 
74 Utah 516, 280 P 1042 (1929) 
A parol lease of lands which has been fulh 
performed bv lessor is not within the statute 
Greenwood v Jackson, 102 Utah 161,12S P.2d 
282 (1942) 
Modification? of contract 
Agreement altering or modifying an original 
contract must also be in writing and sub-
scribed Combined Metals, Inc v Basuan, 71 
Utah 535, 267 P 1020 (1928) 
'The words "as per agreement of 12-8-73*' 
written on a check were not a sufficient memo-
randum m writing to modify a written contract 
for sale of real estate and satisfy the statute of 
frauds Zion's Properties, Inc v Holt, 538 P 2d 
1319 (Utah 1975) 
Jf the original agreement is within the stat-
ute of frauds, a subsequent agreement that 
modifies any of the material parts of the origi-
nal must also satisfy the statute unless a part} 
has changed position by performing an oral 
modification so that it would be inequitable to 
permit the other party to found a claim or de-
fense on the original agreement Allen v 
Ktagdut, m P 2d £S4 (Utah \%%%) 
Mortgages, and estates or interests of par-
ties thereto. 
Since a real estate mortgagor holds title in 
fee subject to the mortgage lien, he has such 
estate or interest in land as may be conveyed 
only by written instrument under this section 
Bybee v Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P2d 118 
(1948) 
Nature of required writing. 
Letter from partners to partnership em-
ployee informing him that he owned undivided 
10% interest in partnership satisfied statute of 
frauds relating to conveyances of real property 
even though it failed to mention consideration 
and ^ a s otherwise not complete contract, since 
all that is required under section is that inter-
est be granted or declared by writing sub-
scribed by party to be charged Guinand v 
Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P 2d 467 (1969) 
Option to purchase. 
Joint owner of land who had orally agreed to, 
but had not signed, option to purchase was not 
obligated to sell real property, and specific per-
formance would not lie to compel conveyance 
Eckard -* Smrtk, 521 P 2d &Z& Wtab \9>Vi) 
Where option to purchase omitted mention of 
oil or mineral rights, court properly admitted 
evidence showing that defendant had leased 
the oil and mineral rights to a third part>, 
which lease had been ratified by the plaintiffs 
Bench v Pace, 538 P 2d 180 (Utah 1975) 
Oral contracts to buy or sell land. 
Mere oral agreement to purchase land from 
another is within statute of frauds Chadwick 
v Arnold, 34 Utah 48, 95 P 527 (1906; 
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purol executed agreement. 
Whtli* no interest in land can be created. 
nnimhTred, or surrendered by merely parol ex-
wlil4irv agreement, a parol executed agree-
ment bv a tenant to surrender leased premises 
+ ** not void under the statute of frauds. Aaron 
s Holmes 35 Utah 49, 99 P. 450 (1908) 
Hniol partition. 
I'ttrlttion of land among coheirs is not inef-
HuHvr, at least in equity, because made by 
unit*), if followed by actual possession in sever-
a l > of parcels into which land was divided 
^Mltttmore v. Cope, 11 Utah 344, 40 P. 256 
A parol partition between joint owners of 
iv^l property, when carried out and followed by 
urtuitl possession in severalty of the several 
ium*lt, is valid and will be enforced notwith-
standing the statute of frauds. Allen v. Allen, 
{,0 Utah 104, 166 P. 1169 (1917). 
l**rt performance of oral contract gener-
ally. 
While a verbal gift or parol agreement to 
v\m\t\\ land is within the statute of frauds and 
M< lrt\N a nullity, a verbal agreement, if part 
uci termed, can, notwithstanding requirement 
vu statute, be enforced by court of equity. Price 
v i.iovd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.S. (n.s.) 
vs,0 0906). 
iw H proceeding to enforce a parol gift of land 
vu» \\w theory of part performance, a showing of 
vKo making of valuable, or substantial, or ben-
kiw\ii\ improvements by the donee in posses-
jkKui or the doing of other analogous acts which 
\\vu\M render revocation and refusal to com-
m i t ' inequitable, is essential to enforcement. 
1>KV \ . Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.A. 
0< > » 870 (1906). 
Otrt! contract by decedent to make will leav-
u ^ i>roperty to plaintiff in consideration of ser-
v>Nv» to be rendered, was enforceable where 
uUmiift' rendered such services as he was 
vWWo upon to perform under contract up to 
v w \>f death of deceased, and during which 
H\»K> h^ was in possession of property by ar-
mn^nient made by deceased. Van Natta v. 
K^wood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920). 
1»» an action to quiet title, defended on the 
f KWITW! that defendant had entered into an oral 
vvittract to purchase property, it was not only 
^KxUiibent upon defendant to prove a certain, 
^ :v.t\ and unambiguous contract for the 
vcvfc-ise of property, but also such acts in part 
^•rkvciance thereof as in equity are consid-
^tve sufficient to take the case out of the stat-
v^ ot frauds Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 
y * * V P. 262, 33 A.L.R. 1481 (1929). 
ive acts which are alleged to constitute part 
KsHortaance must be in pursuance of the oral 
xvtf:r*ct which it is claimed said performance 
*»%*>. Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. 
Herschel Gold Mining Co., 103 Utah 249, 134 
P.2d 1094 (1943). 
Doctrine of part performance to take oral 
contract out of the statute of frauds is purely 
equitable in nature and has no place in an ac-
tion at law. Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 
P.2d 335 (1947» 
Where there was no memorandum reduced 
to wTiting or no writing subscribed by the par-
ties to be charged, but the deceased had ac-
cepted the consideration and surrendered pos-
session, there was sufficient part performance 
to avoid the statute of frauds and the de-
ceased's heirs and successors in title and inter-
est were not entitled to repudiate the contract. 
Such an act would in fact constitute a fraud. In 
re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P.2d 
595 (1953). 
Where plaintiff moved from another city and 
took care of personal and business affairs of the 
decedent in reliance upon an oral contract, 
proved to be clear and certain, the contract was 
removed from the statute of frauds. Randall v. 
Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18,305 P.2d 
480 (1956). 
Sufficient correspondence and part perfor-
mance were reflected in record in unjust en-
richment action to take oral agreement to 
build house for $3,000 out of statute of frauds. 
Jensen v. Whitesides, 13 Utah 2d 193,370 P.2d 
765 (1962). 
Advancement of $44,000 toward develop-
ment of quarries was sufficient part perfor-
mance to remove oral contract from bar of this 
statute. LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 
26 Utah 2d 158, 486 P.2d 1040 (1971). 
Doctrine of part performance is not available 
in an action at law for monetary damages for 
breach of oral contract to convey land. 
McKinnon v. Corporation of President of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974). 
In a case where the existence of an oral con-
tract for the sale of seven lots was admitted by 
both parties, part performance in the form of a 
down payment, two interest payments, and 
conveyance of three lots was enough to remove 
the contract from the statute of frauds. Bald-
win v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413 (Utah 
1984). 
—Improvements and other expenditures. 
In an action to enforce a parol gift of land on 
the theory of part performance, the improve-
ments were not of such value or character as to 
take the case out of the operation of this stat-
ute. Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 
L.R.S. (n.s.) 870 (1906). 
In an action to quiet title, defended on the 
ground that defendant had entered into an oral 
contract to purchase property and had gone 
into possession, making of small improvements 
by defendant was held insufficient to take the 
5 
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case out of the statute of frauds. Hargreaves v. 
Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P. 262, 33 A.L.R. 
1481 (1922). 
In a quiet title action in which the defense 
was that defendant was in possession pursuant 
to a parol gift, evidence that defendant made 
expenditures upon the real estate was not suf-
ficient to take the case out of the statute of 
frauds, even had defendant definitely proven a 
promise to give her the property, where the 
value of defendant's free use of the property 
exceeded the amount allegedly spent for the 
improvements. Moffat v. Hoffman, 61 Utah 
482, 214 P. 308 (1923). 
In an action for specific performance of an 
oral agreement to convey the east half of a cer-
tain parcel of land which was made after the 
written agreement in which plaintiff was to 
have an undivided one-half interest, evidence 
that the land was definitely described, that 
plaintiff entered on part of the east half in reli-
ance upon the parol agreement and actually 
occupied a substantial portion thereof, and 
made permanent and valuable improvements 
thereon, all with the knowledge and consent of 
the vendors, and that plaintiff paid the full 
purchase price, was sufficient evidence of part 
performance to take the oral agreement out of 
the operation of the statute of frauds. Hogan v. 
Swayze, 65 Utah 380, 237 P. 1097 (1925). 
Pleading. 
If the statute of frauds is relied upon, it must 
be pleaded. Skeen v. Van Sickle, 71 Utah 577, 
268 P. 562 (1928). 
Recovery of money paid under parol con-
tract 
Where defendant verbally agreed with the 
owner of real estate which was subject to a 
mortgage to bid for the property in a foreclo-
sure sale and to convey title to plaintiff for a 
sum certain after he obtained the sheriffs 
deed, and plaintiff relied on the agreement and 
paid the specified amount to defendant who as-
serted ownership to the property and refused to 
convey, it was held that a trust ex maleficio 
arose, and was enforceable though the contract 
was not in writing. Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 
Utah 48, 95 P. 527 (1908). 
Release, discharge and surrender. 
Surrender of an interest under a contract for 
the purchase of land could be properly effected 
without deed or conveyance in writing in com-
pliance with this statute. Budge v. Barron, 51 
Utah 234, 169 P. 745 (1917). 
Mortgagor's oral surrender of his interest in 
the land to mortgagee is within this section, so 
as to be unenforceable. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 
Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948). 
Where the right of a purchaser under a con-
tract for the sale of land was subject to forfei-
ture upon failure or refusal to make payments 
or to comply with the terms of the contract, he 
could, with the consent of the vendor, rescind 
the contract and abandon all of his rights un-
der it; and if this is done by any acts or conduct 
which clearly manifest an intention to rescind 
or abandon the contract by both vendor and 
vendee, and vendor takes possession in pursu-
ance of the parol agreement, then the rescis-
sion is complete and binding on both parties. 
Cutnght v. Union Sav. & Inv. Co., 33 Utah 
486, 94 P. 984, 14 Ann. Cas. 725 (1908). 
An executory contract with respect to real 
property may not be rescinded or discharged, 
unless by act or operation of law, where nei-
ther party is in default, without some form of 
written agreement entered into between the 
contracting parties; but where there is breach 
or abandonment of contract by either party, 
the rule is otherwise. Thackeray v. Knight, 57 
Utah 21, 192 P. 263 (1920). 
A wholly executory oral rescission of an ear-
nest money agreement to purchase a home was 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. 
Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986). 
Restrictive covenants. 
Land which was included in an unsuccessful 
petition for rezoning was not bound by restric-
tive covenants executed in connection with a 
later successful petition, where the land, al-
though rezoned, had not been included in the 
later petition and the owner had not signed the 
petition or document of restrictive covenants. 
Gunnell v. Hurst Lumber Co., 30 Utah 2d 209, 
515 P.2d 1274 (1973). 
Specific performance. 
In a proceeding to enforce a parol gift of land 
on the theory of part performance, acts done 
prior to the contract, since they are neither in 
pursuance nor in execution of it, are never part 
performance upon which to base specific per-
formance of the agreement by court of equity. 
Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.A. 
(n.s.) 870 (1906). 
An action to collect money due under a parol 
lease is not an action in specific performance. 
Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d 
282 (1942). 
Plaintiffs who had made a down payment, 
had completed mortgage payments, and had 
paid special curb and gutter assessment pursu-
ant to oral contract for purchase of realty were 
entitled to specific performance. Woolsey v. 
Brown, 539 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975). 
Subscription. 
A document to be enforceable under the stat-
ute of frauds must be subscribed by the party 
granting the conveyance. Williams v. Single-
ton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). 
—Joint tenants. 
Husband could not bind wife, who was joint 
tenant, by contract to purchase the common 
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property since she had not signed the contract 
nor given written authority to agent to 6ign for 
her Williams v Singleton, 723 P 2d 421 (Utah 
1986) 
Trusts. 
Where property was paid for with money of 
the husband, and title thereto was taken in 
name of the wife, a resulting trust arose, to 
which the statute of frauds did not applj An-
derson v Cercone, 54 Utah 345, 180 P 586 
(1919) 
A trust in real property must be created by a 
writing signed by the settlor or his agent 
Sundquist v Sundquist, 639 P 2d 181 (Utah 
1981) 
Wills. 
Where a will is sought to be maintained also 
as a contract, it must satisfy the statute of 
frauds Ward v Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P.2d 
635 (1938) (decided under prior law) 
Writings construed together. 
Several writings may be construed together 
as containing all the terms of a contract, 
though only one is signed by the party to be 
charged, therefore, a written instrument con-
taining an offer to exchange properties, but too 
indefinite as to terms to satisfy this statute, 
and signed by only one party, may be con-
strued with deeds subsequently executed and 
placed in escrow by both parties, for the pur-
pose of establishing a valid agreement within 
the statute of frauds, where the deeds were ex-
ecuted before the attempted withdrawal of the 
offer by the party who signed it Miller v Han-
cock, 67 Utah 202, 246 P 949 (1926) 
A check and an unsigned deed were evidence 
Utah Law Review. — The Doctrine of Part 
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Con-
tracts m Utah, 9 Utah L Rev 91 
An Appraisal of the Utah Statute of Frauds, 
9 Utah L Rev 978 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am Jur 2d Statute of 
Frauds §§ 44-128 
A.L.R. — Price fixed m contract violating 
statute of frauds as evidence of value in action 
on quantum meruit, 21 ALR3d 9 
Applicability of statute of frauds to agree-
ment to rescind contract for sale of land, 42 
A L R 3d 242 
Validity of lease or sublease subscribed by 
one of the parties only, 46 A L R 3d 619 
of a single transaction and entitled to be read 
together to fulfill the requirements of the stat-
ute of frauds where the check contained a nota-
tion "V2 payment on land a6 agreed-other V2 
payment when deed delivered" and the check 
was delivered by the grantee named in the 
deed to the grantor named in the deed who 
endorsed the check and deposited it m his 
checking account, the contents of the unsigned 
deed expressly referred to the parties in ques-
tion and specifically described the subject mat-
ter property, the deed was delivered to the cus-
tody of a bank a few days after the delivery of 
part payment, and the named grantor ac-
knowledged the propnety of the deed 
Gregerson v Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 
1980) 
Several writings may be construed together 
as containing all the terms of a contract for the 
sale of real property, notwithstanding that not 
all are signed by the party to be charged, to 
satisfy the requirements of the statute of 
frauds, some nexus between the writings must 
be shown, which requirement may be satisfied 
either by express reference in the signed writ-
ing to the unsigned one, or by implied refer-
ence gleaned from the contents of the writings 
and the circumstances surrounding the trans-
action, in which instance parol evidence may 
be used to connect an unsigned document to 
one that has been signed by the person to be 
charged Gregerson v Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 
(Utah 1980) 
Cited in Murray v State, 737 P2d 1000 
(Utah 1987), O I C , Inc v Wilcox, 738 P2d 
630 (Utah 1987) 
Conflict of laws comment note on statute of 
frauds and conflict of laws, 47 A L R 3d 137 
Promissory estoppel as basis for avoidance of 
statute of frauds, 56 A L R 3d 1037 
Exceptions to rule that oral gifts of land are 
unenforceable under statute of frauds, 83 
ALR3d 1294 
Check given in land transaction as sufficient 
writing to satisfy statute of frauds, 9 A L R 4th 
1009 
Oil and gas royalty as real or personal prop-
erty, 56 A L R 4th 539 
Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of «=> 
55-80 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers 
of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part 
performance thereof. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Historv: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2477; 
C.L. 1917, § 5824; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
33-5-8. 
ANALYSIS 
Estoppel 
Husband and wife. 
Part performance. 
—In general. 
—Established. 
—Not established. 
Specific performance. 
Estoppel. 
Where prospective purchaser wished to buy 
property from the defendant and defendant 
said that he would sign a contract for the sale 
of the property but he did not do so, no estoppel 
in pais was established. Under the facts the 
plaintiff could not make a case of equitable es-
toppel since the oral representations of the de-
fendant that he would complete the negotia-
tions constituted nothing more than a promise 
as to future conduct, not a representation as to 
a material and existing fact nor the expression 
of an intent to abandon an existing right. 
Ravanno v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 
(1953). 
An estoppel will not arise simply because of 
a breach of promise as to future conduct or be-
cause of a disappointment of expectations on 
an executory agreement. Ravarino v. Price, 
123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953). 
Husband and wife. 
Finding that husband and wife had orally 
agreed to deliver marketable title of land to 
plaintiff was not supported by the evidence, 
since wife had never been consulted about the 
matter at all, and there was no evidence that 
she had agreed to anything. Holmgren Bros. v. 
Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975). 
Part performance. 
—In general. 
If plaintiff relies upon a parol contract of 
sale, the first essential is to establish the con-
tract by competent evidence. In order to make 
possession available as part performance, it 
must appear that it was given or taken in pur-
suance of a parol contract proven; such posses-
sion must be notorious, exclusive, and of the 
very tract of land which was subject of the con-
tract. This possession must be established 
without qualification or doubt. Adams v. Man-
ning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915). 
Merely making improvements will not alone 
take an oral contract out of the statute of 
frauds. Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502 
(1929). 
The doctrine of part performance is to be ap-
plied with great care, paying particular atten-
tion to the policy expressed in the statute of 
frauds and historical precedent where the 
limits have been defined by the process of in-
clusion and exclusion. It is not intended to an-
nul the statute of frauds, but only to prevent 
its being made the means of perpetrating a 
fraud. In order that a person may be permitted 
to give evidence of a contract not in writing, 
and which is in the very teeth of the statute, 
and a nullity at law, it is essential that he es-
tablish in equity by clear and positive proof, 
acts and things done in pursuance and on ac-
count thereof, exclusively referable thereto, 
and which take it out of the operation of the 
statute. Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 
P.2d 570 (1953). 
Where the existence of the oral contract is 
established by an admission of the party resist-
ing specific performance or by competent evi-
dence independent of the acts of part perfor-
mance, the requirement that the acts of part 
performance must be exclusively referable to 
the oral contract is satisfied In re Roth'6 Es-
tate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d 278 (1954). 
Purchaser of land under an oral contract 
seeking to avoid the statute of frauds under the 
doctrine of part performance, based upon his 
possession of the land and improvements 
thereon, must establish that the possession 
was actual, open, exclusive and with the 
seller's consent; improvements made were sub-
stantial, valuable and beneficial; a valuable 
consideration was given in exchange for the 
conveyance; and all of the foregoing was exclu-
sively referable to the contract. Coleman v. 
Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981). 
To meet the part performance exception to 
the statute of frauds, the terms of the oral con-
tract must be established by clear and definite 
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70A-3-504 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
in presenting a note for payment was a ques- tion of law for the court Durnell v. Sowden 
(1887) 5 U 216,14 P 334 
70A-3-504. How presentment made. 
(1) Presentment is a demand for acceptance or payment made upon the 
maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by or on behalf of the 
holder. 
(2) Presentment may be made 
(a) by mail, in which event the time of presentment is deter-
mined by the time of receipt of the mail; or 
(b) through a clearinghouse; or 
(c) at the place of acceptance or payment specified in the instru-
ment or if there be none at the place of business or residence 
of the party to accept or pay. If neither the party to accept 
or pay nor anyone authorized to act for him is present or 
accessible at such place presentment is excused. 
(3) It may be made 
(a) to any one of two or more makers, acceptors, drawees or 
other payors; or 
(b) to any person who has authority to make or refuse the accep-
tance or payment. 
(4) A draft accepted or a note made payable at a bank in the United 
States must be presented at such bank. 
(5) In the cases described in section 70A-4-210 presentment may be 
made in the manner and with the result stated in that section. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-504. and drawee bank's statement that check had 
p « - been drawn against uncollected funds did not 
ross- e erences.
 mnA n Jnn constitute a dishonor amounting to a failure 
Acceptance varying draft, 70A-3-412.
 o f consideration Estate of Kohlhepp v. 
Collecting bank, presentment by notice of
 M a s o n ( 1 9 7 0 ) 25 U 2d 155, 478 P 2d 339. 
item not payable by, through, or at a bank, 
70A-4-210. Collateral References. 
Presentment, notice of dishonor and pro-
 B i U g a n d N o t e s ^ m m 4 0 M Q 5 
™ A \ ™ n e c e S S a r y 0 r P e r m i s s l b l e ' 10 CJS Bills and Notes §§169, 343, 358, 359, 
lUA-O-OUl. ng j OCA Qgg 
^ n Y l SnTy *° W h ° m p r e s e n t m e n t i s 10 AmJur 2d 680, 806, Banks §§ 710, 838,11 
mU„;xcus;dTelay, discharge, 70A-3-502. A m J u r M 9 4 1 ' » " • » * « < * « K 890, 891. 
Waived or excused presentment, protest or ^ j
 A # T. u * ^ ^ . .• * 
notice of dishonor or delay therein, Conduct of holder of check at tune of pre-
nc\L Q en sentation for payment as affecting drawers 
'
UA
"
d
"
511
' liability, 4 ALR 1233 
Presentment for payment. What amounts to presentation to charge 
Inquiry by payee's secretary as to whether parties secondarily liable on paper payable in 
a check not yet endorsed would be paid did a certain town or city, without further speci-
not constitute a presentment for payment, fication of place, 39 ALR 918 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Place of presentment. after exercise of due diligence, purchaser 
Prior to Uniform Negotiable Instruments should have made a valid tender at place of 
Law, it was held that where note secured by business or residence of maker. McCauley v. 
mortgage was sold, and both payee and note Leavitt (1894) 10 U 91, 37 P 164, applying 2 
were out of the state and could not be found Comp. Laws 1888, § 2851. 
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70A-3-507 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 36, 171, 173, 174, 
462 Destruction of or refusal to return bill as 
11 AmJur 2d 942, Bills and Notes § 892 an acceptance, 63 ALR 1138 
70A-3-507. Dishonor — Holder's right of recourse — Term allowing 
representment. 
(1) An instrument is dishonored when 
(a) a necessary or optional presentment is duly made and due 
acceptance or payment is refused or cannot be obtained 
writhin the prescribed time or in case of bank collections the 
instrument is seasonably returned by the midnight deadline 
(section 70a-4-301); or 
(b) presentment is excused and the instrument is not duly 
accepted or paid. 
(2) Subject to any necessary notice of dishonor and protest, the holder 
has upon dishonor an immediate right of recourse against the 
drawers and indorsers. 
(3) Return of an instrument for lack of proper indorsement is not dis-
honor. 
(4) A term in a draft or an indorsement thereof allowing a stated time 
for re-presentment in the event of any dishonor of the draft by 
nonacceptance if a time draft or by nonpayment if a sight draft 
gives the holder as against any secondary party bound by the term 
an option to waive the dishonor without affecting the liability of 
the secondary party and he may present again up to the end of the 
stated time. 
History: L 1965, ch 154, § 3-507. 10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 35, 36, 39, 184, 
217,343,346,367. 
Cross-References.
 n A m J u r ^ 943, Bills and Notes §§ 893, 
Certification of check before returning it 894. 
for lack of proper indorsement, effect, 
70A-3-411 (3) Duty of bank when several checks which, 
Notice of dishonor, 70A-3-508 in the aggregate, exceed the depositor's bal-
Payor bank, recovery of payment by return ance, are presented at the same time, 26 ALR 
of items, 70A-4-301. i486. 
Presentment, how made, 70A-3-504 Liability of bank to depositor for dishonor-
Time allowed for acceptance or payment, ing check, 126 ALR 206. 
70A-3-506. Rights and remedies of holder of draft 
Time of presentment, 70A-3-503. issued under letter of credit which is dishon-
Collateral References. 
Bills and Notes <S= 24-27, 217, 241, 252, 
297, 385, 394 
ored, 53 ALR 57. 
70A-3-508. Notice of dishonor. 
(1) Notice of dishonor may be given to any person who may be liable 
on the instrument by or on behalf of the holder or any party who 
has himself received notice, or any other party who can be com-
pelled to pay the instrument. In addition an agent or bank in whose 
hands the instrument is dishonored may give notice to his principal 
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Order Denying Plaintiff's Objection to Order 
Granting Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or to 
Correct Order, and Directing Defendant 
to Redraft Original Order Granting 
Summary Judgment to Defendant 
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WENDELL E. BENNETT (0287) 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Defendant 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7846 
A£ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-—oooOooo 
RANDY KRANTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KATHY HOLT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTION TO ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL OR TO CORRECT ORDER, 
AND DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO 
REDRAFT ORIGINAL ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO DEFENDANT 
Civil No. 40041 
Judge Cornaby 
oooOooo 
The Plaintiff, having filed an objection to the court's 
Minute Entry granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and 
to the proposed order submitted by counsel for Defendant granting 
summary judgment, and moving the court for a new trial or an 
order to correct the granting of the summary judgment, having 
been submitted to the court on memoranda of both the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant, and the court being advised in the premises, 
now 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that the Plaintiff's 
objections to the Order granting summary judgment and his motion 
for a new trial or a new order to correct the granting of the 
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summary judgment is denied. Defendant, by and through counsel, 
is ordered to redraft the order granting summary judgment, but to 
exclude therefrom, the findings of fact. 
This order has treated the Plaintiff's objection to the 
order granting summary judgment and the motion for a new trial or 
to correct the order as being directed against the court's ruling 
on motions for summary judgment dated December 22, 1989, and also 
the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment mailed December 
27, 1989, but without, however, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law contained therein. The court's adoption, by 
the ruling on objection and motion for a new trial dated January 
29, 1990, the substance of the order prepared by the Defendant 
without, however, the Findings of Fact. 
DATED this /T day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to Ronald C. Barker, attorney for plaintiff, 2870 
South State, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 on this 28th day of 
February, 1990. 
Cj\rT\r\AKM0 J^r 
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APPENDIX "C" 
Order Granting Summary Judgment and 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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f <J_£h j,.
 r., 
CL£; 
W E N D E L L E . BENNETT (li.'li 'I 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Defendant 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7846 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OC ' 
.1111*1 KRAN1,1,, ; 
Plaintiff, : 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
'OTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 40041 
Judge Cornaby 
KATHY HOLT, 
Defendant. 
---ouuOuuu—-
The above-ent i t led matter was heard b'. MM rourt cm I In 
par t i e s 1 nppocinq Mntinrr. Im nummar, TurHqmenl ruppr.rtfil by 
wi J t ten mewuiandum, nn In unl i i I'j, I'nu Ronald t . Barker, lt .i | . 
appeared on behalf of the p l a i n t i f f rtml Wendell I Bennett, F,sq. 
-arerl in lelinlf uf I In ilpfend nil II irl hi in publ ished 
depos i t i imb . ' I.lie pJ a J rit i ± i l^i i> hi. antz, the defendant 
>' Holt, 1111r| a witness Hprhert Hol7er, and havinq considered 
i i n J J s [ n l H I I i i ill in i 11 n I I i 11H | I n I I | n l i i l l I I I I I I * | r / e j i u b e b , 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o 
Defendant the r e l i e f sought in her Counterclaim for rpr is ion of 
CI! A r m 
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the Earnest Money Sales. h greement base ::l mi i]:: • :: :i :i the failure oi 
considerati : i 1 tendered I lain tiff i i :i the for rn. c: <f a personal 
check, whi ch was dishonored; \ :ii olation of the Statute of I rauds; 
of the Statute of Frauds, oi :i t'i :ie fur tiier ground that ti: le closing 
was not time I v The Defendant is also awarded her taxable < 
in i " 11 in i f i •ii'iiiiiii in I '| 11 II hi I  In I HI I hi II MI in il ii | c i I I i I I it: o iredi ir e . 
DATED this J day of March, 1990, 
BY THE COUI>*. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do h = xeby c e r t i f y Miril II nirii I 1 M f i m •' t\mi i r IMP I n\\\\ nf 
t h e foregoing "Or de .r Grant ing Defendant" G "Motion for" Summa i y 
Judgment ai id Denying P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Summary Judgment" t o 
Formhl c Ii i t kei" ; I I mi n^y II pi a i I!" i I III' "!! i ! I  I M l • 11- *-- I'mi I t 
Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 on this 28th day of February Il "'•  o > 
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1 
2 
3 
t 
5 
b 
7 
e 
9 
i <* 
1 K 
A I 
But 
a e t o cash x. 
c se as of f -
A I 
l I i 
• _ h e c ! 
0 What ox a --i. sav o .u . *. **.? 
A H He luUe I L in LIII3 1 ma i . 
Q f i k o * n w o h i n r r i o n f #n f - K ^ ^ - P 
A 
Q 
A 7 ha 
0 Now, you were here wl ten Hi . Krar i tz 
i i i i i mi i i in i I in 11 ? 
A N €is , in \. 
0 Y o u h o t v i i wf»n f i t 1 *-w i , f » t v * t ' t t p i I m q y o u 
a L " H i ! 1 11 M |»i in" ii 11 h H i l i i in in 11 I II i II 11 II II i II i I II i in i II i mi in n y 
h o c : a u s e o f t h e d o I n , I n r e c o r d i n g * ? 
A * - > : 
0 ' i v o u r m o m o r y « l I I ? 
A :• * *."- ' ' * I remembered 1-
Q
 w i ^|„ |e c j f ly s e t ^ o r C I C ; 
^nf7 i^ere yov1 " ^ ^ «-K»«~ 
money had b r rn dopos i tod ar.:' , - ;r, s„ 'J',b Land '! ; t l c 
Co nip aii i., i* 
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EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Legend Ye 
This is • l*B»!ly binding contract. Retd ' 
m 
REALTOR*' 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sect, ton s) 
INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded her em. this sale s ha '- .r- * * * » * \ : ~ ~ L e- - * * * r * • e- • . - * - . J V ^ • ng 
ng a»!r«Conditionmg and ventilating fixtures and equipment wate- Kea'e ^u.«h m appliances i'g^1 f . * ;^ f« a^d bu = Ds bathrcx - «« e- -T* * a* d-a.-w-tes 
rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds awmngs «nsie-iec te>evii;on antenna. %*ai> to-waM carpets *a.e 4*~r-e t ±_-i- * .
 # * age door 
er and transmitter(s). fencing, trees and shrubs 
INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by 
>n of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size location, present value future value, income 
from or as to (is production Buyer accepts the property »n "as is" condftion subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer des »res 
additional inspection, said inspection shall bt if lowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Bi Iyer. 
'.. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seder ha; received no claim nor notice of any bu»ldmg or zoning violation concerning the property which 
not or will not be rernedted prior to closing, (b; all obligations against the property including taxes assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances 
\y nature shall be brought current on c before closing, and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditionrng and ventilating systems electrical system, and appliances 
i be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing 
>. CONDIT ION OF WELL. Selle warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Sellers' knowledge,, provided' an adequate supply oi 
•r and continued use of the well on * -ells is a> ithonzed by a state permit or other legal water right 
:, CONDI r iON Of SEP I IC TANK. Seller warra' its tl tat »r ty septic tn ik servif »g the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge,,, in go o-d working order and 
si" Il tas i 10 ki t owl edge of »ny needed' repairs and it meets all applicable government health and const, ruction standards 
:
, ACCELERAT ION CLAUSE. No tatei than fifteei \ (15]I days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreemw n, but i tot less thar three (3) clays prior to dosing, 
ti iJ tail provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against xt>e property require th« 
MM it of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sate of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rata and /or declare the entire balance dut in the 
it of sale. If any such document so provides and holder dees not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after not^e c 
waiver or disapproval or on the date of dosing, whichever is earlier, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notici 
eller or Seller's agent. In such case, all earnest money received under 'this Agreement she" be returned 'to Buyer. It; is understood and agreed that if pro1 'ision; 
MI * d "Due on Sa I e eta us* are set fc rt h in S act i o n ? her m i i, a I te r na i. * es a 11 owed her e i n aha 11 b ec o mi e n i 111 an d vo»d 
B. TfTLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (15} days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, Buye 
II have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorneys opirwon. or a preliminary titl* repon on the subject property 
ur shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine end accept If Buyer does not accept Buyer shall give written notice thereof to SeJIei 
Seller's agent, within the prescribed ume period specifying objections to title Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure th< 
K:t(s) to which Buyer has objected If sard defect(s) is not curable through Bn escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall 'be null and void at tl »e optio* 
* *
 ,ft
 «yer. and all monies received herewith shall be retur r>«j to the respec live parties. 
TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Setter authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a tiMr\dmd form ALT; 
icy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Setter shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other thai 
se provided for in said standard form, and the encumbrance's or defects excepted under the final contract of tale. If title cannot be made so insurable througl 
escrow agreement at dosing, the eernesi money shall, unless Buyer elects to wa*ve such defects oi encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreemen 
.11 thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge. 
t EXISTING TENANT LEASES. I f Buyer is to take title subjec i to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyet i i la .e ft m \ frheei • (15) day 
rr Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior tc cios»ng a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) atfectim 
property Unless written obfect»on is 9'ven by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent within three (3) working days thereafter. Buyer shall take title Subject fo sue 
se s I f o b j ec 11 o n 11 n ot t em ed»e d w 11: h "i I he ti, a t e d ti n i e tl i * g r e e i i • e i 11 s I i a I ! be i i u I' m i d v o> d. 
-—'•«»" btfort signing. 
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>TMO\rv the tmou"Upf ^ Uj£~*—tfltZAW/J. 
D* ' i 
r) p | 
'. NEV  n tp t * » f ^ j j a •i ^ / / n o 
5-/- - 6 L 
he'eby Deposits with Brokerage 
- Daiisrs (S ^ O C t S O }. 
. which i h i i i be deposited m accordance with a p pi»table Suite Lew 
Hiii-f ^ d b 
Phone Numoer 
O f PER TO PURCHASE 
£>AEPTY DESCRIPTION The above si l ted EARNEST MONEY n giver n tu secure and apply on the purchase of the p roper ty s i tuates at /S^/ f ^ * 
JUb^OO^L , lAJO^^ft in the City of . County o* dirt /mT T^T. * ' . Utah. 
any restrictive covenants zoning regulations utility or other easements or ngms of way., government patents or Mb's deeds of recorc approved by Buyer 
ince ¥viTh Sec11on G SBid propeny 11 more pan»cu!ar11 • described as , — _ _,_ __ _ _ _ . _ _ _», ._. 
; APPLICABLE BOXES: 
VtPROVED REAi PROPERTY G Vacant Lot C Vacant Acraage C Other _ _ _ _ __.,. _ , _, _ _ _ _ 
ROVED REAL PROPERTY D Commercial %. Residential D Condo C Other 
Inc luded ttnms. Unless excluded betow1 this sale shall tncfuoe all futures and any of the tiems shown m Section A if presently attached to the property 
fol lowing persona? prope/ry shall also be included in thts sale and conveyed unde*' separate Biii of Saie with war ramies as to tuie _A~£****k<- ^ _____ 
Excluded it arm The folio wing items 8  are specifically excluded from this *»>»• / f t ^ ^ . ^_ 
CONNECTIONS U T I J 1 
he sewer ^ rco ' -ec tec" 
UC tank 42< o n n e*. *ec 
•f san'tary sN-ste^ 
die wate r t *conne: tec 
ate m ' * £? .* -<*» '*-: 
-
i J t !
- R J G H T S Se ite' represents thai the property includes the fol lowing improvements in the purchase price: 
onecie^. C i t h e r ^ e i e c i n c u y ^C connected 
£ } *-tgai ' ***'? secondary system J^ngress & egress by private easement 
-
 0* shaies Company fi dedicated road *)S'pa *ed 
K " * ame^ra £> master antenna ©prewired t curb and guner 
J^ - a ca* j£j o '.ected ^^uther rights 
Suf" 
Buy * "» - f 
j i t ion e*cep* 
* o - Buve " a' 
.. . . . „ . p i 1111 u ciosmg iS *»fc a i not be f ur • ;s hed 
fcrf- •* and subject to Section 1 (tr* abo*e and I: below aciepts ii ir its preseni physical 
JRCHASE PRICE AND rlNANLJnJU i ^ e 
- _ Dollars <S A 7 , 6 0 0 ^ 2 . 
* £ 2 ^ L ^ . : , / _ i ^ , Z . 
which shad be paid as follows: 
&QC>& representing the apprpximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at dosing. 
- representing The approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust devi nou ie* t% aic contran or one i eitcumprence IL be assumed 
by buyer, which obit gut ten » bears intei esi « _,» ,„ « % per an* tun i w tt monthly p*Ymf ," , I^ "," ' •— —. - ..... ... — — -
whicl i include: Dpr incipal ; Dinterest; Otaxes; Dinsurance; Dcondo fees Dother . _ ^ _ 
representing the approximate balance of »n additional existing mortgage, trust 'deed note, real estate contract or othe< encumbrances to be 
ts % u m e d by 8 wye r,, wh i c h o bt i g at »o n be a i s i rue r esi a t,_,-_—___«_, % pm a' •» »ui i wn I i im, o n th I y pa y m e n t s o f 'I „.,__ _____ ».., ._.._— ,.,..,. 
which include: Cpr inc ipal ; Dinterest; Dtaxes" Dinsurance: Dcondo fees; Doth#r 
. _ _ _ representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a n e w . _ _ _ _ _ loen. to be paid as follow?" . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ 
sooodi 
Other 
TOTAI PURCHASE PRICE 
»j* d e i u b j ect to 6 u ye r Q ua 1 i h/«n g f o r • n d 1 e n a i ng i n i t i t u 11 or g r a i 11 n g SJ» d esavm puon and " or ft ne no n g B \ i ye'" a g i e e s 1 o ma k e a p p 11 ca 11 o n w i th m .srzn=a»* 
r Seller i tcceptanct of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation end/or obtain tha new financing at an interest rate not to exceed _———.. . % 
Joes not Qualify for the assumption and ;or financing within **—*" 
tton of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice 
agrees to pay * ^ -^ towards Buver s tota< *»nancing a ^ «. ^ - ^ . ^ j * * * ,..fc ^ 
Agreement involves the assumption of an existing lo^n or obliga1 or cr me propen> Sec'io*" f iha app
 r 
"Bays afier Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, thts Agreement shall be voidable 
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INSPECTION O* TITLE In accordance w ^ ^ t j i e n G Buyer shall have the opportunity to mspec t titte to the subject prop* nor ic~fctaaing 
,hai!"ta*.e title sublet to any e>ts:.ng restrictive covenants inciuomg conoonvmum restrictions (CC & R I) Buyer r has Z. has not reviewed-an^-corroo-
CC & R s pr»or tc s<gn»ng this Agreement 
VESTING OF TITLE. Title snail vesi m Buye* as follows 
SELLER WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C the following items are also warranted ^ ^ A ^ V ^ T 
Dns to the aoove and Section C shaii be iimaeo to the following / T y / M i 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES 
rfied pnor tc closmc 
. This offer is made subject to ttie following special conditions a no or-contingencies whtrh must 
3 Jut j - / ^ - Q^_ ><•*-*-*-.
 LVMjupjL*\ U+- f ^^S^^^^'^f A/ iy i f Yi^ 
CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be oosed on or before . reasonable location to be designated by 
subject to Section Q Upon demand Buyer snai! deposit with the Escrow Doting Office aM documents necessary to complete the purchase m accordance 
is Agreement Prorations set fortn in Section R shall be made as of C date of possessions'date of closing D other. 
POSSESSION. Selier shall deliver possession to Buyer on _ . unless emended by written agreement of parties 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this 
nent by reference 
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller 
ave until H*QO (AJJL/'PM) UMJfo 1 . 1 9 pig to accept this oHer Unless accepted this offer shall laose and the Aoent shall return the 
1ST MON 
ure of Buye1 
EY tc tr^ Buyer. V 
^~ | - ^ ^ D a t e Signature of Buyer Date 
V U 
C ONE 
IEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
ECTlON Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing oh>r (Seller's Initials) 
JNTER OFFER. Seiler hereby accepts the foregoing o*er SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or \r\ the attached Addendum, and 
ents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance Buyer shall have until (A M . / P M ) . 19 to accept the terms 
:>fied below. 
JL 
t I > Sff (AM-PM) 
Signature erf Seller 
K ONE: / 
rer accepts the counter offer 
rtt accepts with modifications on attached addendum 
. (AM-PM) Signature of Buyer 
Signature of Seller 
Signature of Buyer 
) M M l S S l O N . The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to: 
tmission of . as consideration for the efforts in procuring a buyer. 
. (Brokerage) 
iture of Seller Date Signature of Seller Date 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
ate Law requires Broker to furnish Buyti «nd Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefore 
mpteted)
 x 7 
C I acknowledge receipt of a final copy /ft the foregoing Agreement bearing ail signatures 
ATUR 
**•< 
Daie 
S IGNATj&l OF BUTE* 
(AX^Z 
Date 
Date 
C l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing oil signatures to be mailed o n . 
•ed Mail and return rece»pt attached hereto to the Z Seiif r ~ Buye* Sent by 
1 9 . by 
o — % _ e t 
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JTHORITY C 3NATORS It Buyer of S / a corporation penne'sh p trust estate or othe/ y the person executing th/"~ <reement on «ts 
rrants hi$ or he» authority to do »c anc to b«nd b-yer or Sei l f 
}MPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties v>ti supersede* ano 
>y tno all prior negotiations representations warranties understandings or agreements between the parties There are no ve'bai agr«tments which tnodify 
his agreement This Agreement cannot be cnanged except by mutual wnnen agreement of the parties 
OUNTER OFFERS Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyef shall be m writing and if attached hereto shall mco'porate all the provisions of this 
a not expressly modified or excluoed therein 
EFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES In the event of default by Buyer Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as l»Qu»dstec 
or to institute suit to enforce any rights o* Se4ief in the event o< defau't b> Selief or if this sale fa«ls to close because of the nonsatisfacnon & any 
ondition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue o' any default by Buyer) tne earnest money depos t 
•turned to Buyer Both parties agree that should anther parry default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained the defaulting p*rty she l 
>sts and expenses including a reasonable attorney's fee which may anse or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or tn pursuing any 
rovided hereunder or by applicable law whether such remedy ts pursueo by filing suit or otherwise m the event the principal broker ho»d«ng the earnest 
eposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred tc herein the Buyer and Se'ler 
the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount 
t remaining eher advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court m accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaurtmg 
II pay the court costs and reasonable attorney s tees incurred by the pnnctpal broker m bringing such action 
ABROGATION. Execution of a fmel reel estate contract if any shall abrogate this Agreement 
ISK OF LOSS All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there rs less or damage to the property 
the date hereof and the date of dosing by reason of fire vandalism flood earthquake or acts of God and t^e cost to repair such damage shall exceed 
•ni (10%) of the purchase price of the property Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees m writing to mpau or 
lamaged property prior to dosing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property ts less than ten percent (10%) of the purchaie price 
K agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair 9r\d replace damaged property prior to closing this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to mter'uption of transport 
ire flooc extreme weather governmental regulations acts of God or simitar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller 4hen the closing dme shal' 
ded seven (7) days beyond cessation of such conostion but »n no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the closing date p'ovided herein Th^yresfter 
if the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing date Closing shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments art signed 
'ered by all parties to the transaction 
CLOSING COSTS Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half ( 1 / 2 ) of the escrow closing fee unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs 
jmg title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid b> Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year insurance, rf acceptable to th» Buver 
>d interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section B Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves 
assigned to Buyer at closing 
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title title shall be conveyed by warranty dt^i free of defects ofier than 
cepted herem If th.»s Agreement is fof sale or transfer of a Seller s interest under an existing rea' estate contract Sellef may transfer by e*ther (a special 
t deeo containing Seller s assignment of satd contract in form suffoent to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the 
•ting real estate contract therein 
AGENCY DISCLOSURE Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller 
BROKERAGE For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term ' Brokerage shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate otf»ce 
DAYS. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term 'days" shelf mean business or worxing days exclusive of legal holidays 
FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
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A I assume because both names are on the 
title. 
0 Any other reason that you know of? 
A No. 
0 Did you ever talk with your ex-husband and 
request his approval? 
MR. BENNETT: Is this prior to the 6-4-86 
timeline in Paragraph 7 or at any time? 
MR. BARKER: Prior to the actual date of the 
closing that was scheduled at the title company. 
THE WITNESS: I'm getting several questions 
from you. Will you rephrase that? 
0 (By Mr. Barker) Prior to the time that 
Mr. Krantz appeared at the title company to close the 
transaction, did you ever discuss with your ex-husband, 
Stephen Holt, whether or not ho approved the 
transaction as contemplated by Paragraph 7 of 
Exhibit 2? 
A Yes, 1 did. 
0 When did that conversation take place? 
A Approximately one week after the earnest 
money offer. 
0 Where did 1t take place? 
A I can't recal I . 
0 Who was present? 
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A My husband and myself. 
0 In person or on the telephone? 
A I can f t reca11. 
0 What did you sav to him and he to you with 
respect to that matter? 
A 1 said, "I have an offer on the house. What 
do you think of that?*' He said, "It's up to you." 
0 Is that the full content of the conversation 
with respect to his approval? 
A In a nutshel1. 
0 Were there any other conversations between 
yourself and your ex-husband concerning his approval? 
A I can f t reca!1. 
0 Had the transaction contemplated by 
Exhibit 2 to the Krantz deposition closed, would 
Stephen Holt have received any of the proceeds? 
A No. 
Q Now, Paragraph 8 of Exhibit 2 to the Krantz 
deposition indicates a closing date of August 20th, 
1986. Are you familiar with that? 
A Yes . 
0 Did you discuss with Mr. Krantz some 
alternate closing date? 
A No. 
0 Was the closing date fixed at some date 
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